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Abstract
Stapp’s counterfactual argument for quantum nonlocality based upon a Hardy entangled state is
shown to be flawed. While he has correctly analyzed a particular framework using the method of
consistent histories, there are alternative frameworks which do not support his argument. The framework
dependence of quantum counterfactual arguments, with analogs in classical counterfactuals, vitiates
the claim that nonlocal (superluminal) influences exist in the quantum world. Instead it shows that
counterfactual arguments are of limited use for analyzing these questions.
1 Introduction
Henry Stapp [1] has challenged an argument by the author [2, 3] which claims to demonstrate that
quantum mechanics is a local theory, in the sense that it contains no long-range dynamical influences. Stapp
asserts that the validity of a certain counterfactual statement, SR in Sec. 4 below, referring to the properties
of a particular particle, depends upon the choice of which measurement is made on a different particle
at a spatially distant location. He further claims that this dependence is confirmed by an approach to
counterfactuals presented in Ch. 19 of the author’s Consistent Quantum Theory [4], hereafter referred to as
CQT. It will be argued that, on the contrary, the possibility of deriving the counterfactual SR depends on
the point of view or perspective that is adopted—specifically on the framework as that term is employed in
CQT—when analyzing the quantum system, and this dependence makes it impossible to construct a sound
argument for nonlocality, contrary to Stapp’s claim.
The study below is based upon the (“consistent” or “decoherent”) histories formulation of quantum
mechanics. Since there is an extended treatment in CQT, a brief summary in [5], and expositions of inter-
mediate length in [6,7], the details need not be repeated here, though it is worth emphasizing some features
of this approach. First, in contrast to standard textbook quantum mechanics the histories approach permits
a discussion of microscopic quantum properties corresponding to subspaces of the quantum Hilbert space
without any reference to measurements. As a result it has no measurement problem of the sort that besets
standard quantum mechanics, which in its more orthodox versions is only allowed to speak about macro-
scopic preparations and measurement outcomes. Microscopic and macroscopic systems are addressed in the
histories approach using exactly the same fundamental quantum principles, and one can explain how and
why a measurement outcome (pointer position) can be related to the microscopic quantum property that
precedes the measurement, the property that the measurement is intended to reveal. Because of its ability to
relate measurement outcomes to prior measured properties the histories approach is sometimes thought to be
a “hidden variables” theory, and then dismissed as necessarily leading to the usual paradoxes associated with
such theories. But it is classical hidden variables which, as Stapp points out, are inconsistent with quantum
principles and lead to paradoxes, whereas the histories approach employs genuine nonclassical microscopic
(and macroscopic) quantum properties, which are treated in a consistent way that avoids paradoxes.
Counterfactuals and their use in quantum theory are discussed in Secs. 19.3 and 19.4 of CQT. A brief
introduction, which should suffice for the present paper, is given in Sec. 2 below, based upon a particular
(classical) example. Stapp’s criticism in [1] uses a quantum state introduced by Hardy [8]. That state and
some associated measurements are presented in Sec. 3 using the notation for entangled qubits (spin-half or
two-state systems) common in current discussions of quantum information. Stapp’s counterfactual SR is
the topic of Sec. 4. Section 5 summarizes the conclusions of the paper, while Sec. 6 is an addendum with a
response to comments by Stapp in the last section of [1].
2 Counterfactuals
Suppose a gun fires a bullet which comes to a stop in a block of wood separating the gun from a glass
beaker. What would have happened if the wooden block had not been in the way? This is a counterfactual
question comparing an “actual” worldW1 in which something took place, with a “counterfactual” world W2
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which resembles W1 in certain respects, but differs from it in others. Such counterfactual reasoning is quite
common in everyday experience, but trying to codify it and nail down the rules has given philosophers a lot
of trouble. A fundamental difficulty is that there are often several choices for W2, each different fromW1 but
in different respects. If counterfactual reasoning about the classical world of everyday experience involves
subtleties, one should not be surprised if similar or even worse difficulties arise when trying to extend it to
the quantum world.
Before discussing quantum issues let us complicate our classical example slightly by assuming that the
gun can be aimed in several different directions, only one of which is towards the beaker, and the aim is
determined just before the gun is fired by tossing a coin. This could be done by using the random outcome
of some quantum measurement, e.g., using the number of radioactive atoms decaying during a specified time
interval, though such a quantum source of randomness is not essential for the present discussion. Similarly,
we might suppose that the wooden block is left in place or quickly pushed away so that it no longer protects
the beaker depending on the outcome of a (suitably rapid) coin toss. Our counterfactual question as to
what would have happened had the wooden block not been in the way now becomes less definite, or at least
could be interpreted in more than one way. Should we be thinking that the gun actually was directed at the
beaker (and thus at the wooden block) in the case of interest, or should we allow for the possibility that it
might have been pointed in some other direction? The second interpretation leads to a probabilistic answer.
“The beaker would have been shattered with probability 1/4, and remained unbroken with probability 3/4”
is a sensible response if the gun could have pointed with equal probability in four different directions, only
one of them aimed towards the beaker. Probabilistic answers to counterfactual questions can make perfectly
good sense in a stochastic setting.
In CQT Ch. 19 it is suggested that quantum situations analogous to the example just discussed could
be usefully analyzed in the following way. First it is necessary that all the properties, macroscopic or
microscopic that one wishes to discuss, whether in W1 or W2, must belong to a single quantum framework
or consistent family of histories. This single framework rule is fundamental to quantum reasoning according
to the histories approach, see Ch. 16 of CQT, so it is natural to require that it also be observed when dealing
with counterfactuals. Sometimes this can be done by thinking of a closed quantum system which contains
a quantum coin toss (or perhaps several tosses) with different outcomes corresponding to different worlds.
Next, work backwards in time from what actually happens in W1 to a time at which W1 is identical to
W2, and identify a state of affairs, called the pivot, which is the same in both worlds. Then apply the laws
of quantum dynamics to predict, generally in a probabilistic sense, what will later take place in W2. It is
often helpful to use a time-ordered tree diagram as an aid to analyzing the situation; several examples, both
classical and quantum, will be found in Ch. 19 of CQT.
The result of this analysis will in general depend upon the framework of consistent families used to
define, and differentiate, W1 and W2, and on the choice of the pivot. Counterfactual questions can have a
variety of answers. Another way of stating the matter is that such questions are often to a certain degree
ambiguous, and thus can be interpreted in different ways. Choosing a specific framework and pivot makes
the counterfactual question more precise, but then the (probabilistic) answer to the question may depend
on this choice. In the previous example one might want to use a pivot that corresponds to the situation
just after the gun is fired, when the direction in which it is aimed has already been decided, assuming W1
and W2 are at this time identical. In this case one can conclude that in the counterfactual world, with the
wooden block out of the way, the bullet will certainly, with probability 1, shatter the beaker. However,
if the pivot is chosen at a time before flipping the coin that determines the direction in which the gun is
aimed, the answer, as noted above, is only probabilistic, and thus less definite. To be sure, one might think
it more natural, and perhaps closer to everyday usage, if a “sharper” answer to a counterfactual question is
preferable to a less definite one. In the situation at hand, “the beaker would have been shattered” is sharper,
more definite, than the less definite probabilistic response. In any case nothing is lost by focusing attention
on the precise respects in which the worlds of interest differ, and the route that leads to a particular answer
to a counterfactual question.
3 Hardy’s State
In what follows it is helpful to employ an explicit wave function of the Hardy [8] type. In place of Hardy’s
original notation we use one that is by now fairly familiar in discussions of quantum information. Think
of two spin-half particles (qubits) a and b, where for each particle the orthonormal basis |0〉, |1〉 consists of
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eigenkets of Sz,
Sz |0〉 = (1/2)|0〉, Sz|1〉 = −(1/2)|1〉, (1)
in units of h¯. The alternative orthonormal basis defined by
√
2 |+〉 = |0〉+ |1〉,
√
2 |−〉 = |0〉 − |1〉, (2)
consists of eigenkets of Sx with eigenvalues +1/2 and −1/2, respectively. In this notation we write the Hardy
state in the form √
3|ψ0〉 = |0〉a ⊗ |0〉b + |0〉a ⊗ |1〉b + |1〉a ⊗ |0〉b (3)
(The reader may prefer to abbreviate |0〉a ⊗ |1〉b to |01〉.) The a and b subscripts are used both to label the
states and to differentiate the angular momentum operators for the two particles in an obvious way: Sax, Sbz ,
etc. Once the Hardy state has been created, by whatever means, at a time t0 it remains unchanged under
unitary time development—a trivial time development operator Ia⊗Ib, corresponding to zero magnetic field,
so the spins do not precess—up to a time t2 when one particle or the other begins to interact with some
measuring device.
In the histories approach measurement apparatus must, at least in principle, be described in fully quantum
mechanical terms. The proper way to do this in the case of idealized measuring processes is discussed
extensively in CQT, see in particular Chs. 17 and 18, and more briefly in [7]. For present purposes we may
assume that an apparatus designed to measure Sbz for particle b is initially in the state |Zb〉. The unitary
time transformation describing the result of its interacting with particle b in the time interval from t2 to t3
is given by
|0〉b ⊗ |Zb〉 → |0〉b ⊗ |Z+b 〉, |1〉b ⊗ |Zb〉 → |1〉b ⊗ |Z−b 〉, (4)
where one should think of |Z+
b
〉 and |Z−
b
〉 as macroscopically distinct, corresponding to different pointer
positions in the traditional language of quantum foundations. The projectors on such states—equivalently,
the corresponding properties—will be denoted by Z+
b
and Z−
b
. One can make the model more realistic in
various ways, e.g., using density operators for the apparatus, see Chs. 17 and 18 of CQT, but that is not
needed for the following discussion. In a similar way an apparatus designed to measure Sbx for particle b
starts in a state Xb, and the time transformation analogous to (4) for the time interval from t2 to t3 is
|+〉b ⊗ |Xb〉 → |+〉b ⊗ |X+b 〉, |−〉b ⊗ |Xb〉 → |−〉b ⊗ |X−b 〉. (5)
An apparatus designed to measure Sbz can be changed into one that measures Sbx by turning on a suitable
magnetic field just ahead of the entrance of the Sbz device, one which causes states Sbx = ±1/2 to precess
into states Sbz = ±1/2. Let us refer to these two possibilities as measurement settings of the apparatus,
denoted by |Zb〉 and |Xb〉 as used above. We can imagine that the presence or absence of this magnetic field
is determined by a quantum coin of the sort described in CQT, at a time just before the arrival of the b
particle. In the same way one can imagine that measurements of Saz or Sax on particle a can be determined
by an apparatus with settings |Za〉 and |Xa〉, which could be set by a different quantum coin shortly before
the arrival of the a particle.
Table I relates the notation used here to that of Hardy [8] and Stapp [1]. Thus Za corresponds to Hardy’s
U1 and Stapp’s ML1, whereas the outcome Z
+
a corresponds to U1 = 0 and ML1+, and Z
−
a to U1 = 1 and
ML1−.
Table 1: Comparison of notation
This paper Hardy Stapp
Za: Z
+
a
, Z−
a
U1: U1 = 0, 1 ML1: ML1+,ML1−
Xa: X
+
a , X
−
a D1: D1 = 0, 1 ML2: ML2−,ML2+
Zb: Z
+
b
, Z−
b
U2: U2 = 0, 1 MR1: MR1−,MR1+
Xb: X
+
b
, X−
b
D2: D2 = 0, 1 MR2: MR2+,MR2−
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4 Stapp’s Counterfactual
Stapp’s counterfactual SR [1] translated into the notation of Sec. 3 reads as follows:
SR: Suppose that Sbz is measured on particle b and the result is Z
−
b
. Then if instead of Sbz, Sbx
had been measured on particle b the result would have been X+
b
with certainty, i.e., probability
one.
One can derive SR using the approach to quantum counterfactuals in Ch. 19 of CQT if an appropriate
choice is made for both framework and pivot. A suitable framework is the collection of histories
[Ψ0]⊙ {[0]a, [1]a} ⊙ {Xb, Zb} ⊙ {X+b , X−b , Z+b , Z−b }, (6)
with time increasing from left to right, interpreted as follows. As in CQT we use the notation [ψ] = |ψ〉〈ψ|
for the projector onto a quantum state |ψ〉. At the initial time t0 the quantum state is |Ψ0〉 = |ψ0〉 ⊗ |M〉,
where |ψ0〉 is the Hardy state (3) and |M〉 is the initial state of the apparatus which will later measure
some component of the spin of particle b, along with the quantum coin which will determine whether the
apparatus is set up to measure Sbz or Sbx. The ⊙ is a tensor product symbol, but for present purposes one
can regard it as simply separating events at different times. At t1 particle a is in one of the two mutually
exclusive states |0〉a or |1〉a, denoted by the projectors [0]a and [1]a, and nothing is said about particle b or
the apparatus. As usual, [0]a is equivalent to [0]a ⊗ Ib ⊗ IM , where Ib and IM are the identity operators on
particle b and the apparatus. At a later time t2 the quantum coin flip results in the apparatus being in one
of the two states Xb or Zb, ready to measure Sbz or Sbx, whereas at a still later time t3 the measurement
outcomes (pointer positions) are X+
b
, etc., in an obvious notation.
Ψ0
[0]a
[1]a
Xb
Zb
Xb
Zb
X+
b
Z+
b
Z−
b
X+
b
X−
b
Z+
b
(a)
Ψ0
[+]a
[−]a
Xb
Zb
Xb
Zb
X+
b
X−
b
Z+
b
Z−
b
X+
b
X−
b
Z−
b
(b)
Figure 1: Diagrams for (a) the family (6); (b) the family (7).
The family of histories in (6), which is easily shown to be consistent using the methods in CQT, can
also be conveniently represented in Fig. 1(a), where again time increases from left to right and the different
lines correspond to the different histories which occur with finite probability. Thus the line from Ψ0 that
terminates in the second node from the top, labeled Z+
b
, in the right column indicates a history in which,
starting from the initial state, the a particle was at time t1 in |0〉a, Saz = +1/2, the quantum coin flip
resulted in Zb, thus Sbz and not Sbx being measured, with an eventual measurement outcome of Z
+
b
. The
other lines have analogous interpretations. Two of the nodes one might have expected in the right hand
column are absent: following [0]a and Xb there is no X
−
b
, and following [1]a and Zb there is no Z
−
b
. This is
because the probabilities of these histories are zero: they never occur.
Using Fig. 1(a) based on (6) it is possible to derive the counterfactual statement SR in the following
way. Suppose Sbz is measured and the outcome is Z
−
b
. The Z−
b
node only occurs in the upper half of the
diagram, and tracing this history backwards in time one concludes that at an earlier time particle a was in
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the state [0]a. Using this node as the pivot, and assuming that in the counterfactual world the quantum
coin toss resulted in Xb rather than Zb, follow the line from [0]a to Xb and then on to X
+
b
. The conclusion
is that had Sbx been measured the result would have been X
+
b
with certainty, probability one.
However, (6) is not the only framework or family of histories one might use to analyze the situation. An
alternative family
[Ψ0]⊙ {[+]a, [−]a} ⊙ {Xb, Zb} ⊙ {X+b , X−b , Z+b , Z−b }, (7)
differs from (6) only in that the possible properties of particle a at time t1 are now the eigenstates of Sax
instead of Saz. As the projectors associated with Sax do not commute with those associated with Saz the two
families in (6) and (7) are incompatible: the results of reasoning using one cannot be combined with results
using the other; this is the single framework rule discussed at length in CQT. The family (7) corresponds
to the diagram in Fig. 1(b), which resembles (a), but differs from it in two respects, in addition to the fact
that the [0]a and [1]a nodes have been replaced with [+]a and [−]a. First, the node Z−b , the starting point of
the counterfactual SR, occurs twice at the final time t3; it follows both [+]a and [−]a. Therefore one cannot
conclude from Z−
b
that Sax had a particular value at t1: it could have been either positive or negative.
Second, both of the Xb nodes at time t2 are followed by both possible outcomes, X
+
b
and X−
b
, with finite
probabilities. Either of these changes is enough to prevent the derivation of SR in its precise form, given
above, if one uses the family (7). One would, instead, have to be content with a weaker form in which SR
would end with: “. . . the result would have been X+
b
with a probability p.” Here p is some probability less
than 1.
Thus the strict counterfactual SR (conclusion with probability 1) can be derived using a certain consistent
family, but only a weaker version can be obtained using a different family. Which is correct? In the quantum
world, no less than in the classical world, there is in general no “right” way to discuss counterfactuals. Would
the beaker have been shattered if the board had not been in place? The answer depends, as discussed in
Sec. 2, on how one goes about addressing the question, which is to say how one makes it more precise by
specifying the ways in which world W2 coincides with and how it differs from W1. That there is a particular
framework in which SR (in its original strict form) can be derived is a nontrivial results that depends, among
other things, on the form of the Hardy state (3). One could adopt the convention that SR is correct provided
one can find at least one framework and pivot which justifies it, and in that case it follows from the argument
based on (6) and Fig. 1(a); the existence of other frameworks or pivots that lead to less definite results is
irrelevant. The classical example analyzed in Sec. 2 would suggest that such a convention is not implausible,
but it would in any case be a convention; there are no strict and universally accepted rules for how to handle
counterfactual arguments. Stapp, in particular, does not accept this convention [9].
The preceding discussion employs properties of particle a and makes no reference to measurements on
particle a. In contrast to textbook quantum mechanics, the histories approach allows statements to be
made about microscopic properties without reference to measurements. However, the arguments we have
just presented, and the diagrams in Fig. 1, remain perfectly valid if one allows particle a to interact at
some time later than t1 with an apparatus (which must, of course, be included in the analysis as part of
the total quantum system) whose setting of |Za〉 or |Xa〉, to measure Sax or Saz , may be chosen by a
quantum coin near this apparatus just before the arrival of particle a. As neither of the families in (6) or
(7) makes any reference to the later measurement on particle a or its outcome, the probabilities employed
in constructing them, and therefore the diagrams in Fig. 1(a) and (b) remain unchanged. So again there
is at least one framework in which SR can be derived, and another (in fact many others) in which only a
weakened form, with probability p < 1, can be obtained. If one adopts the convention (which, as noted
above, Stapp rejects) that the sharpest answer to a counterfactual question, the most precise one that can
be found considering different frameworks and pivots, is the correct one, SR is always correct, independent
of the outcome of the quantum coin flip that results in |Xa〉 or |Za〉. In particular the families in (6) and
(7) remain consistent if the set of events at time t2 is augmented so that {Xb, Zb} is replaced with the four
possibilities {XaXb, XaZb, ZaXb, ZaZb}. (We remind the reader that the product PQ of two commuting
projectors P and Q is to be interpreted as the conjunction of the properties: P AND Q.)
But what can one say about measurement outcomes on the a side? Here care is needed: it is not possible
to add the outcomesX−a , X
+
a for particle a to the family (6), nor is it possible to add the outcomes Z
−
a , Z
+
a to
the family in (7), without violating consistency conditions and thus rendering the family meaningless. One
can, on the other hand, achieve consistency in both cases either by saying nothing (use the quantum identity
operator) or by using appropriately chosen macroscopic quantum superpositions—MQS or Schro¨dinger cat
state—in place of the pointer basis. The reader is referred to the discussion in Sec. 19.4 of CQT, e.g., that
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associated with Eq. (19.12), and we leave it as an exercise to work out which MQS and which “ordinary”
or “pointer” states are permitted by the consistency conditions in the situation under consideration here.
It should be emphasized that the histories approach does not have an automatic commitment to using the
pointer basis: while in many situations it is the most useful description to employ in terms of what one is
interested in discussing, this is a matter of utility, not necessity.
Thus whether or not one can derive SR (in the precise, not the weakened, form) is very much a matter
of the choice of framework and pivot. There is always at least one framework and pivot for which the such
a derivation is possible, and this is true for either outcome of the quantum coin flip that determines the
measurement settings |Za〉 or |Xa〉 for the apparatus that will interact with particle a. Stapp has made a
particular choice of framework, one might call it a “hybrid,” in which the derivation of SR is possible when
the coin results in |Za〉 but not when it results in |Xa〉. However, there is an alternative choice of framework,
in which the pointer basis is replaced by suitable MQS states, for which in the |Za〉 case the derivation of SR
is impossible, but is possible in the case |Xa〉! From the perspective of fundamental quantum theory there
is no reason to prefer one of these frameworks to the other.
Some additional points. First, the dependence of counterfactual conclusions on the framework and pivot
was pointed out explicitly in CQT, both in Ch. 19 where counterfactuals are first discussed, and in Ch. 25
where they are applied to the paradox presented in an earlier paper by Hardy [10]. It is not an idea developed
more recently in order to respond to [1]. Second, the choice of framework (and pivot) is one made by the
physicist in constructing a description of the quantum world, and is not some sort of “physical influence”
upon that world. See the discussion in Sec. 27.3 of CQT. A quantum framework is something like a point
of view. A coffee cup looks different when viewed from below than when viewed from above. Changing the
viewpoint does not change the cup, though it changes what one knows or can say about the cup. Third, as
long as there is no interaction between particles a and b following their preparation, the temporal ordering of
events on the a (left) side relative to those on the b (right) side—e.g., whether measurements are carried out
first on particle a or first on particle b—makes no difference whatsoever for the consistency of the different
families or the probabilities of events within one family. One can even assume that the measurements on
b occur inside the backward light cone of the measurements on a, or vice versa; see the discussion of such
situations in [7]. This is precisely what one would expect to be the case in the absence of any nonlocal
influences of the sort that Stapp claims exist, so it is an additional confirmation of their nonexistence.
5 Conclusion
What we have shown is that, given the Hardy state and appropriate settings for measurements on particle
b, there are frameworks, with (6) an example, in which it is possible to use the method of counterfactual
reasoning presented in Ch. 19 of CQT in order to derive Stapp’s SR in its strict form (probability 1), while
there are other frameworks, for example (7), in which such a derivation is not possible, and one can only
obtain a weaker, probabilistic form of SR. The example given by Stapp in [1] is a combination of the two, a
framework in which SR can be derived provided a quantum coin results in a measurement setting |Za〉 for
the distant particle a and one uses a pointer basis for the measurement outcomes, whereas the derivation is
not possible if the coin leads to the setting |Xa〉 and one again employs the pointer basis. However, this fails
to prove the existence of nonlocal influences in quantum mechanics because, as discussed in Sec. 4, there are
alternative frameworks in which one can arrive at different results. In particular, there is a framework in
which the case |Za〉 followed by an MQS basis makes the derivation of SR impossible, whereas in the case
|Xa〉 one can derive SR. The existence of these different frameworks undermines any argument for nonlocality
which depends upon a particular choice among them.
Thus what Stapp has shown is not the existence of quantum nonlocality, but instead the inadequacy of
counterfactual reasoning of the sort he is advocating for analyzing situations of this kind. Fortunately, there
are other approaches to answering the question of nonlocal influences. Neither Stapp nor anyone else has
yet found a defect in the relatively straightforward (no counterfactuals) demonstration of the principle of
Einstein locality given in [2], a principle which directly contradicts Stapp’s claims of nonlocality.
None of this should be taken to imply that the study of counterfactual reasoning in the quantum domain
is impossible or uninteresting or must always lead to ambiguous results. Instead, it is a tool that needs to
be used carefully, with full recognition of its ambiguities and the possibility that it can mislead, especially if
one employs inconsistent ideas, such as the treatment of measurement using wave function collapse found in
current textbooks, rather than starting off with a sound formulation of quantum mechanics that is consistent
with the mathematical structure of Hilbert space.
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6 Final Note
The preceding sections were written before seeing the final section, “Response to Griffiths’ Reply”, in [1].
Hopefully the following remarks will enable the reader to better understand the points at which Stapp and
I differ, and assess the merits of each position. Before mentioning the differences it is worth emphasizing
that there are significant points on which we agree. Stapp prefers to use a framework which only includes
macroscopic outcomes of measurements, and he is free to do so. His conclusions drawn from this frameworks
about the correctness, or let us say the derivability, of the counterfactual SR, are in accord with the inference
scheme given in Ch. 19 of CQT. The same is true of the frameworks I prefer (and am free) to use, those
shown in Fig. 1, which include microscopic properties of particle a but make no reference to measurements
on this particle or their outcomes. (It is typical of the histories approach that different frameworks can be
employed, and there is no law of nature which specifies the “correct” framework. Frameworks are chosen on
the basis of what issues one wants to discuss, and there is a very general argument, Ch. 16 of CQT, for the
overall consistency of the histories approach provided one pays strict attention to its single framework rule,
which forbids combining incompatible frameworks.)
Our major disagreement is over the conclusions which can be drawn from these analyses. Stapp believes
that because he has identified a framework which properly corresponds to his earlier argument for nonlocal
influences, and in this framework the ability to deduce SR is linked to which measurement is carried out on
particle a, this demonstrates a nonlocal influence on particle b. I disagree, because there exist alternative
frameworks in which there is no such link between measurement choices on a and the derivation of SR for b.
The existence of alternative frameworks in which one can draw different conclusions is already present in the
case of classical counterfactuals, as discussed in Sec. 2, and one cannot expect the quantum situation to be
any simpler. So why believe a conclusion found in one framework but not supported by a similar analysis in
another? The reader will have to judge whether Stapp makes a convincing case for nonlocality or whether,
as is my opinion, he has only demonstrated the hazards involved in trying to use this mode of counterfactual
reasoning to reach sound conclusions about the quantum world.
Another point of agreement is that my proof of Einstein locality in [2] is correct about what it asserts
when it is applied to the present situation in the following way: Let there be a third particle c which is
initially in one of two states |c〉 = |0〉 or |1〉. Let it interact with the measuring apparatus associated with
particle a after that particle has been separated from particle b, in particular after the preparation of both
particles in the entangled Hardy state (3), in such a way that if |c〉 = |0〉 the apparatus will measure Saz ,
and if |c〉 = |1〉 the apparatus will measure Sax. Then the probabilities of any sequence of events involving
the distant particle b or its measurement apparatus will be exactly the same whatever the initial state, |0〉
or |1〉, of c.
Our disagreement is about whether Einstein locality in this form rules out any nonlocal influence by the
choice of measurement (as determined by c) on particle a, on the distant particle b. My position is that since
this measurement choice has no effect upon the probabilities which describe b or its associated measurement
apparatus, it has no “influence” in any sense akin to the usual notion of physical influence. Stapp asserts
that the influence is not one that is revealed by probabilities, but by something else. I confess I do not
understand his reasoning at this point, so must leave it to the reader to assess its validity. He also asserts
that the omission of a counterfactual discussion from my derivation of Einstein locality represents a severe
deficiency, a fatal flaw. Here again we disagree; Stapp has much more confidence in the soundness of his
counterfactual approach than do I. So again the reader must judge. Let me add that while the basics of
the histories approach as presented in CQT seem fundamentally sound—or at least no significant flaws have
thus far been pointed out by critics [11]—the part in Ch. 19 having to do with counterfactual reasoning is
more tentative than the rest. In particular, it involves the direction (past versus future) of time in a way not
present in the main formalism, which is time symmetric. Revisions of this aspect of the histories approach
to quantum counterfactuals, which has a very definite time asymmetry, may be needed when the problem
of thermodynamic irreversibility has been better understood in quantum terms.
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